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Terrorism and Religious Fundamentalism:
Prospects for a Predictive Paradigmi
Douglas Pratt
The term ‘fundamentalism’, broadly speaking, names today a religio-political perspective found in 
many if not all major religions in the contemporary world. Most disturbingly, it is associated with 
variant forms of religious extremism and thus religiously-oriented terrorism, in particular – though 
by no means exclusively – that of an Islamic ilk. Movements of a fundamentalist type are evident in 
Islam, certainly, but they may be found also in Christianity, in Hinduism, in Judaism and other 
religious communities. Contemporary fundamentalism is not the sole province of any one religion. 
And an upsurge in the totalising claims of fundamentalist ideologues, of whatever religion, together 
with the utilisation of globalized communication, transportation and related modern technologies, 
means that the issue of religious fundamentalism itself requires, once again, some careful attention.ii 
Although both Christianity and Islam are susceptible to imperialist impositions of one sort or 
another, as history only too clearly has demonstrated, it is nonetheless the case that Islamic 
modalities of terrorism have presently taken centre-stage in current world affairs. However, the 
religious fundamentalism with which Islamist extremism is associated arguably follows an 
identifiable paradigm that has a wider purview. 
Given the pressing need to be able to identify, predict, locate and so counter any potential terrorising 
extremism born of certain expressions of religion, then the task of analysing the phenomenon of 
religious fundamentalism so as to construct a heuristic paradigm capable of providing a measure of 
predictability would seem both obvious and urgent. In this paper I shall explore the nature of 
fundamentalism as such, examine fundamentalism and also terrorism in respect to Islam, then 
outline a paradigm of fundamentalism that, I contend, could enable the development of a predictive 
capability in respect to identifying genuine possibilities for religious extremism and terrorism.
I suggest that ‘religious fundamentalism’ denotes a worldview-type that can be found across 
different religions in the world of today. Specifically, the term denotes, as I will seek to 
demonstrate, a paradigm that paves the way for a shift in mentality from the relative harmlessness of 
an otherwise quaint, ultra-conservative – or in some apropos sense idiosyncratic relative to an 
orthodox ‘norm’ – religious belief system; to a religiously motivated and fanatically followed 
engagement in aggressively impositional, even terrorising, activity. Understanding the structure, 
logic, and implementation of this paradigm is, I suggest, of vital importance in the endeavour to 
create any meaningful counter terrorist capability able to address religiously motivated and sourced 
terrorism. 
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Fundamentalism 
The term ‘fundamentalism’ and its usage arose in a uniquely Christian context, whence it has 
migrated into other arenas of discourse. A series of booklets, simply titled The Fundamentals, was 
published in America early in the twentieth-century to promote the view that there is a fundamental 
defining and non-negotiable set of traditional Christian doctrines. As a distinctive term, 
‘fundamentalism’ arose to refer to the generic idea proposed by the publication of the booklets. In 
an age where theological liberalism had been in the ascendancy, a fresh term enabled a new 
countering viewpoint to be identified and promoted.iii There was abroad the sense of needing to do 
battle royal for the fundamentals of the faith, and in this context the badge of fundamentalism was 
proudly worn. However, subsequent and wider application of the term has not been without 
problems and difficulties. It does not transfer well into religious contexts other than Christian, and it 
is imprecise enough even within the Christian camp. Nevertheless, it has gained wide coinage. 
In a nutshell, ‘fundamentalism’ may be understood in terms of whatever it is ‘against’. Often it is 
used as “a pejorative description for anyone who is regarded as having a closed mind with regard to 
a particular issue.”iv As a subject of critical academic scrutiny, fundamentalism, in its Christian 
context, has been the focus of a number of notable books and studies in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century.v This has broadened out into studies on a wide-ranging front, inclusive of both 
religious and political variants of fundamentalism.vi The five-year ‘Fundamentalism Project’ 
sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has made a major contribution. This 
project commenced in 1987 and led, during the 90s, to the publication of several substantial 
volumes of research output.vii More recently there have been a number of studies where the focus 
has been on Islamic fundamentalism.viii The result of such academic development has been, among 
other things, to identify a number of generic elements or dimensions of fundamentalism per se. For 
example, Martin E. Marty observed that “fundamentalisms look backward and set out to ‘freeze’ 
some moment, some event, some text or texts from the past as the perfect place in time or space 
from which to measure” life in the present.ix An imagined ‘golden-age’, believed to have pertained 
at the religion’s foundation, is held up as the model and reference point for contemporary reality. In 
response to the critique that religion, and in particular fundamentalist religion, is but an 
epiphenomenon riding on what are really political ideas and actions, or that fundamentalism is 
really just a passing fad, such studies have only served to highlight what subsequent history and 
recent events underscore: that religious fundamentalism is a deeply rooted phenomenon that can 
give rise to, rather than itself relies upon, political acts. 
One significant conclusion that arose from the Fundamentalism project was the recognition that 
fundamentalists
"fear loss and change through whatever serves to relativize the world and their worlds. 
There is constant fear of pluralism, or the stranger who brings other ways which may be 
alluring or threatening. … Pluralism confuses; it presents not only the threatening but also 
2
Marburg Journal of Religion: Volume 11, No. 1 (June 2006)
the attractive neighbour at hand, and that could lead to loss of identity in a group."x
Furthermore, far from being archaic and fossilised, fundamentalist movements are instead “lively, 
intense, creative”, setting out to make a difference, indeed to change the world.xi Religious 
fundamentalism can imply a narrow, strict and limited metaphysics and set of doctrines, which to a 
greater or lesser degree hardly impinge on the wider life of a society; it can mean a worldview 
perspective that engenders, if not demands, the advocacy of a socio-political ordering and action to 
achieve an intended outcome. There is nothing startlingly new about that, of course. But the key 
difference between religiously-driven political actions today, in contrast with any previous point in 
history, is the pervasive context of globalisation. Instead of localised and regional levels of action, 
the technology and mentality of a globalized world now allow for a degree of internationalisation of 
the ideologies and activities of fundamentalist movements as never before.
Fundamentalism and Islam
Bassam Tibi, an outspoken critic of much of contemporary Islam, was one of the researchers 
involved in the American Fundamentalism Project. Islamic fundamentalism, he says,
"strongly rejects (the) spirit of religious pluralism, dismissing it as a heresy threatening the 
neo-absolutist claim for the dominance of political Islam throughout the world. The 
intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism, Sayyid Qutb who inspired Bin Laden, was 
also the one who claimed an Islamic world order to replace the present one. Fundamentalism 
is not only an intellectual challenge, it is a challenge to security inasmuch as it proposes to 
topple the existing order. … The challenge (is) a very concrete one posed and practiced by 
… jihad-fighters willing to sacrifice their lives."xii
Tibi further asserts: “There is a real challenge of fundamentalism as a threat that results in creating 
disorder. This challenge is not only posed to the West and to its civilization, but also to decent 
Muslims – men and women – who suffer the intolerance and totalitarian views and practices of the 
Islamists”.xiii However, he views fundamentalism per se as primarily, if not solely, a political 
phenomenon that is first and foremost “an aggressive politicization of religion undertaken in the 
pursuit of nonreligious ends”. Thus, in his view, fundamentalism is only secondly and “superficially 
a form of terrorism or extremism”. Nevertheless he issues a salutary warning:
"In the long run the Islamic fundamentalists are far more dangerous as ideologues of power 
than as extremists who kill … Fundamentalism is a Weltanschauung, or worldview, that 
seeks to establish its own order, and thus to separate the peoples of Islamic civilization from 
the rest of humanity while claiming for their worldview a universal standing. … Islamic 
fundamentalists challenge and undermine the secular order of the body politic and aim to 
replace it with a divine order … Certainly Islamic fundamentalists will not be able to impose 
their “order” on the world, but they can create disorder, on a vast scale."xiv
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Tibi views religious fundamentalism as a generic politicization of religion. Thus, in effect, he views 
fundamentalism as but one variety of a relatively new global phenomenon in international politics. 
He states:
"I identify religious fundamentalism not as a spiritual faith, but as a political ideology based 
on the politicizing of religion for sociopolitical and economic goals in the pursuit of 
establishing a divine order. … this ideology is exclusive, in the sense that it attacks opposing 
options, primarily those secular outlooks that resist the linking of religion to politics."xv
For him it is a political ideology, not the religion linked with the ideology, which is the point at 
issue. But it is the advocated assumption of a deep dichotomy between religion and politics which is 
problematic for much religious fundamentalism generally, and certainly for Islamic 
fundamentalism. Islam, broadly speaking, has ever championed an inherent linking of religion and 
politics: the necessary symbiosis of Islam as religion and Islam as civilization is the default position 
which Tibi seems to be overlooking. Certainly, as himself a devout Muslim, Tibi is deeply 
concerned about the identification of Islam, per se, with fundamentalism: “Islam as a religion is 
definitely not a threat, but Islamic fundamentalism is”.xvi He is thus most concerned about the 
blurring of the distinction between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism in the media: “it is important 
to not only distinguish clearly between the two but also to make clear that the phenomenon [that is, 
religious fundamentalism as such] is not restricted to the Islamic world”.xvii 
Tibi sees current Islamic fundamentalism as an outgrowth of tensions that hold between the secular 
worldview of western cultural modernity and the monotheistic worldview of Islam. It is these 
tensions which can become a source of international socio-political conflict. Nevertheless it is an 
interpretation and application of religious sources that predominate in the forming of Islamist 
ideologies, and Tibi acknowledges that. As he notes, “In their writings … Islamic fundamentalists 
present themselves as true scripturalists, though they invoke the scriptures in a highly selective 
manner”.xviii Furthermore, such Muslim fundamentalists, he argues, “are not traditionalists; their 
ideal is the selectively perceived and arbitrarily purified state of seventh-century Islam”.xix That 
Islamic fundamentalists go beyond the Qur’an is given credence by an Egyptian example of a 
fundamentalist sheikh, or legal scholar, a “renowned authority on the Islamic concept of human 
rights” who declared in a fatwah of June 1993 – published in a London-based Arabic newspaper – 
that “every Muslim who pleads for the suspension of the shari‘a is an apostate and can be killed. 
The killing of those apostates cannot be prosecuted under Islamic law because this killing is 
justified”.xx However, nowhere in the Qur’an is there support for such a fatwah. “The command to 
slay reasoning Muslims is un-Islamic, an invention of Islamic fundamentalists”.xxi Tibi’s critique is 
trenchant and far-ranging, although he does tend to gloss the religious basis and component of 
Islamic fundamentalist ideology. In the end I think he provides an example of the critical scholar 
who yet underplays the religious dimension. I suggest it is the ideology of religious fundamentalism 
as such that needs to be addressed if there is to be any sustained successful counter to the 
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contemporary threat of Islamist terrorism, or indeed of any terrorism that arises out of, or in 
conjunction with, a particular religious milieu.
Fundamentalism and Islamist Terrorism
What 9/11, the subsequent bombings in Madrid, and more recently London 7/7, have revealed is 
that suicide-bombing Muslims, enacting out their warped jihad, are by no means the poor, 
oppressed, and dispossessed of this world. Whatever their lot in life they have been well educated 
for the most part; they have had sufficient affluence to travel with impunity; they have had access to 
sophisticated technology. Indeed, in the aftermath of the London bombings there is increasing 
evidence of the recruitment of affluent middle class Muslims in British universities to the radical 
Islamist cause. A joint Home Office and Foreign Office dossier on Young Muslims and Extremism 
places likely recruits in two categories: those well educated, especially in the engineering and IT 
(Information Technology) fields,xxii together with those who may not be unintelligent, but who have 
emerged in their youth as underachievers, often having already come to the attention of authorities 
in relation to criminal activities.xxiii 
Furthermore, the report claims that young professionals from privileged backgrounds, as well as 
students, “have become involved in extremist politics and even terrorism”. Such young Muslim men 
have enjoyed all the benefits and opportunities of the contemporary globalized industrialised world. 
These are not the warrior peasants of old, intent on sweeping out the corrupt and decayed 
administrations in order to inaugurate a renewal of their society. There may have been an echo of 
that ancient Islamic paradigm motivating Pashtun tribesman of the Taliban. It is most certainly not 
the agenda of an al Qaeda terrorist cell. Extreme actions are not being called for in the name of a 
societal reformation and the overthrow of evil. Rather evil is being employed for no more reason, 
practically speaking, than a cruelly quixotic tilting at the windmill of Western society per se. As 
Johann Hari remarked of the July 2005 London bombers, they “were not poor, they were not 
persecuted, they were not personally humiliated”.xxiv For Hari, any explanation of their actions can 
only lie in “the extraordinary power of political ideas”. But the political dimension is clearly 
embedded in the religious, as Hari implies: “With one leap of faith … they were soldiers in the 
International Jihad, doing the work of Allah himself to liberate Muslim peoples across the world.”xxv 
A template for this can be found in the three-way relationship between Britain, Pakistan and 
globalized Islamism. Muslims from England have been active in various Pakistan-based militant 
groups, engaged in a jihad in Kashmir, since the early 90s; the Kashmiri-focussed groups – whose 
jihad is against Indian occupation of Kashmir – later in the 90s established links with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. Significantly, the clue to this linking is found in the shared Deobandi ideology of an 
“ultra-conservative strand” of Sunni Islam that in turn has links to the hard-line Wahhabi ideology 
emanating from Saudi Arabia. From this it is evident that some of these initially quite locally-
focussed groups, in terms of the outworking of jihad, have now been linked to international 
terrorism: jihad is thus globalized, by virtue of the logic of extending jihad beyond a local context 
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together with applying the logic of an ultra-conservative and militant form of Islam. Further, as the 
Observer report that discusses this development notes, modern globalized militancy works by way 
of “a long chain of personal and organisational associations”.xxvi Thus the difficulty in identifying 
and locating – let alone rooting out – potential terrorist groups before they act: there are few overt 
institutional or structural elements whereby such potential terrorists can be identified. 
The implication, of course, is that the first component in any countering strategy has to be in respect 
to identifying, and addressing, ideological rhetoric and elements within communities from which 
potential terrorists are likely to come, and by which they are likely to be nourished. The war on 
terror is a war of ideology; in particular, it is a war against the dominance of certain religious 
fundamentalisms. Of course, by virtue of being “extremists”, the individuals who carry out terrorist 
atrocities are properly disowned by the community of faith with which they are otherwise identified. 
Their actions are condemned as un-Islamic, as contrary to Quranic dictate, and inimical to 
normative Islam. Alongside this rejection of aberrant behaviour there is also a direct and outright 
denial by some – possibly many – from within the Muslim community of any Islamic link to the 
situation in the first place. Attempts to redirect responsibility elsewhere, including claiming the 
attacks were the work of America or Israel, are not unknown. Such paradoxical and absolute denial 
of Islamically-driven terrorism, by Muslims, is based on an ideological stance which goes, in effect: 
“Given that such terrorism harms Muslims and besmirches Islam, any true Muslim could not 
possibly commit it.” This line of thought surfaced after the 9/11 attacks when a Muslim mentality of 
denial led to rumours of Jewish conspiracy theories as the root cause and not Islamic disaffection, 
let alone an Islamic ideology as such. Straws of denial and deflection are being desperately clutched 
at by some. As Waleed Aly remarks:
"An emotive confusion drives denial and this is demonstrated by the inconsistency of the 
reasoning that accompanies it. Too often, those who deny that Muslims are in any way 
responsible for terrorism also blame a belligerent Western foreign policy towards Muslim 
nations for the terrorist backlash. Such Orwellian doublethink destroys the necessary 
credibility to inspire honest engagement."xxvii
On the one hand there is a refusal, on ideological grounds, to believe fellow-Muslims could even 
commit such acts of terrorism; on the other hand Islamic extremists will target Muslim and non-
Muslim alike on equally ideological grounds. One result is that the many moderate and peace-loving 
Muslims in western secularised communities “are just angry and tired of being held hostage by the 
acts of other Muslims”.xxviii So what is driving contemporary globalized Islamic extremism and 
terrorism? Is it just a contemporary socio-political aberration in a religious guise? Are these little 
more than the anarchists of our age? 
The joint report, referred to above, noted that among likely candidates for anarchic terrorist cells of 
the present-day Muslim variety are “loners” who gravitate to ethnic or religious university clubs, or 
the like, and who also clearly register “disillusionment with their current existence”. The issue at 
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this level is not with the clubs as such, but with the possible psychological profile of certain of their 
members. Neither of these variables, even taken together, would help to identify a potential suicide-
bomber. However, the report goes on to identify the rhetoric of communal disillusionment as a third 
factor, noting in particular the oft-repeated disapproving response to the double standard attributed 
to “the foreign policy of western governments, in particular Britain and the US”. This may provide 
the prospect of a more obvious measure of discontent, except that there are many mainstream 
Christian Churches and their congregations which express similar critiques, cater for ethnic 
identities, are by definition ‘religious clubs’, and very often encourage ‘loners’ into their midst. 
Identifying a religious extremism inclining to criminal activity is not going to be easy.
Arguably, when the matter of attending to public discourse is pressed, a potential measure of the 
propensity to terrorism can be identified in terms of a scrutiny of certain forms of Muslim rhetoric, 
namely when there is unequivocal advocacy of the view that, vis-à-vis an Islamic context, ‘passive 
oppression’ – as evidenced within the UK, for example, by a foreign policy of non-action in 
Kashmir or Chechnya – has been eclipsed by an intentional ‘active oppression’ against Muslims and 
Islam. That is to say, in regards to the advocating rhetoric, military interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the so-called ‘war on terror’, or whatever else may be deemed to express ‘active oppression’, 
may be taken by Muslims as, indeed, acts perpetrated against Islam per se. Acts against Muslims in 
a specific context are interpreted as acts conducted against Islam generally and universally, thereby 
calling forth and legitimating, qua the logic and rhetoric of jihad, an aggressive Islamic response. 
Where such rhetoric of advocacy and argumentation is fomented there may well be a case for pre-
emptive countering action on the part of the authorities concerned. The problem, of course, is that 
such action only reinforces the rhetoric.
It is certainly the case that Muslim tendencies to reform and modernise that emerged in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries have been eclipsed, in recent decades, by the rise of Islamism, and more 
latterly by globalized and internationalized Islamic extremism. Islamists assert Islam as a 
revolutionary idea and programme with the aim of utterly destroying the social structure of the 
world in order to build it anew. Jihad is thus revolutionary combat in a transcendent cause. In the 
view of such an extremist perspective, Islam is not a matter of optional belief but is inherently a 
total and totalising socio-ideological system. Thus, the message of Islam is believed to have been 
addressed to all humankind. For the Islamist, this means every person who believes in the message 
becomes, ipso facto, a member of the ‘Islamic party’ or the ‘party of God’, which is engaged in an 
inherent struggle to put in place a new civilisation explicitly based on the ‘word of God’. This is the 
essence of the paradigm that has motivated the pattern, found throughout Islamic history, of popular 
overthrow of Muslim governments deemed corrupt and un-Islamic: jihad is taken up as a tool of 
social salvation; deep disaffection finds resolution in assertive jihadic action. Jihad is viewed as a 
Muslim liberation struggle to be engaged in on multiple fronts, and terrorism becomes a legitimate 
tool of jihad. Or so the logic, born of the rhetoric, can go. And so religious terrorism derives from 
an ideology of religious fundamentalism. One political correspondent, writing in the aftermath of 
the 2005 London bombings, seemed to get the point when he noting that, rather than taking up arms 
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in the so-called “war against terrorism”, the real issue has to do with the “battle to discredit an 
ideology … it is an idea that caused the attack, and it is the idea that must be undermined”.xxix And 
another Observer report noted that authorities are intent on “examining literature for clues to the 
precise ideology” that may have inspired the bombers.xxx Investigations are said to have revealed 
that as far back as January 2005 there was mounting concern within the young men’s own Muslim 
communities that their hardening fundamentalist and extremist attitudes and opinions were taking 
them far beyond the pale of normative Islam. Indeed, they had been ostracised and told they were 
not welcome in certain mosques because of their advocacy of “inappropriate teachings”. Their 
“increasing fundamentalism” had estranged them from their own. Yet, local Muslim acquaintances 
could not foresee the possibility of terrorist action, suggesting that there is as yet a very real 
difficulty for religious people to understand the range of ideological options, and the significance of 
the shifts that occur in an individual’s ideological stance, from within a given religion. This appears 
acutely the case for Muslim communities right now, but should in no way be deemed a uniquely 
Muslim issue.
Religious Fundamentalism as a paradigm for terrorism
Fundamentalism is both a specifically focussed mindset and a certain kind of narrow worldview, a 
modus operandi, which can apply to just about any sphere of human activity, but especially so to 
religion and politics, for both are concerned with the context and aims of human existence. 
Fundamentalism, as a framework phenomenon that applies across more than just one religion, and 
which can be applied also to other non-religious spheres of human commitment and worldview, is 
marked, I suggest, by at least twelve key factors. Others may be adduced, but these twelve, and the 
way they are interconnected, need to be carefully understood. For it is these features, collectively 
and cumulatively that, I contend, move a fundamentalist mindset from the quirky to the critical, 
from atavism to aggression, from benign eccentricity to socially endangering activity. The factors 
comprise six sets of paired features, and it is the particular sequential combination which is 
important, not just the factors themselves.
Set 1 – Principal Presuppositions: 
(i) Perspectival Absolutism and (ii) Immediate Inerrancy
A fundamentalist perspective is inherently absolutist: all other relevant phenomena are explained on 
its terms or viewed in a relativising way with reference to it. Fundamentalism, as a mindset, is first 
and foremost a mentality that expresses the modernist project writ large: only one truth; one 
authority; one authentic narrative that accounts for all; one right way to be. And, of course, that way 
is my way, declares the fundamentalist. Further, a fundamentalist perspective deems itself 
privileged in respect to this absolutism, for it implies superiority of knowledge and truth. Indeed, 
this is inherent to holding an absolutist perspective as such. Absolutism of outlook or worldview is 
a mark of fundamentalism, but not of itself a signal of potential terror.
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Allied to absolutism is the view that the grounding text – be it political manifesto or holy writ – is to 
be read as conveying an immediate truth or value, without error; that is, it is inherently or effectively 
inerrant. However, the assertion of the immediate inerrancy of the text – namely reading the text as 
being immediately applicable and providing a non-mediated access to ultimate or divine truth – in 
fact involves an implicit assertion that there is only one normative interpretive reading allowed: that 
which is undertaken through the fundamentalist’s lens. Now a fundamentalist’s presumption of 
textual immediacy and inerrancy is, of course, but one interpretive option. Nevertheless, from the 
fundamentalist perspective, alternative and variant interpretations are deemed inherently false or 
heretical, and so are rejected: there can only ever be one truth, one verity, one valid interpretation.
So far as religion is concerned, these two interconnected factors – perspectival absolutism and 
immediate inerrancy – comprise the foundational or principal presuppositions of a religious 
fundamentalism that, on their own, might simply indicate little more than one among many options 
for the expression of religious belief. Most often a secularist, an agnostic, or a religious liberal in the 
West would view these factors to be the essence of fundamentalism: an atavistic expression of 
religious thought, a quirky mindset, a rather odd out-of-step religious mentality; easily ignored, best 
avoided, of no consequence or significance in the greater scheme of things. But, I contend, this is 
not all there is to fundamentalism. 
Set 2 – Authority Derivation:
(iii) Apodicity assumption and (iv) Narrow Narrative Indwelling
Building directly upon the preceding set, the third and fourth factors together constitute the basis of 
authority claimed by fundamentalism as such, namely, in the first instance, the assumption that the 
authority source, most usually textual (though not necessarily scriptural: together with the relevant 
scripture there are many other possibilities of textual sources upon which a fundamentalist might 
rely), is unambiguous, thus requiring no interposing hermeneutic. This is sometimes understood in 
terms of ‘literalism’, but for a fundamentalist the key issue is that the authority of the text is such 
that no intermediary interpretive framework is required – the text itself provides pellucid expression 
of truth, whether in terms of an abstract universal, or in respect to a pragmatic or programmatic 
articulation of the values and views espoused by the fundamentalist as the truth. This provides the 
authorisation underlying the preceding presupposition of immediate inerrancy. 
Paradoxically, of course, any so-called ‘literalist’ reading, or regarding a text as not requiring 
intentional hermeneutical application, is itself a modality of interpretation, namely a fundamentalist 
one. It is often assumed, by a fundamentalist, that a ‘direct’ reading of the text can be made so as to 
avoid the murky waters of interpretation. That is to say, there is no need to apply any sort of 
intellectual critique or scrutiny of the text: meaning can be immediately read off; the text at hand is 
clear in its composition; the message conveyed by the text is apodictic. Not so. The fundamentalist 
makes the assumption that meaning and truth can be directly read without recourse to a frame of 
meaning that supplies a key to understanding. Again, not so: every fundamentalist reading of the 
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Bible, the Qur’an, or whatever, necessarily requires a prior-held framework of understanding about 
the nature of the text and the meanings of the key terms and concepts employed. 
Nevertheless, allied to the assumption of apodicity is the factor of narrow narrative indwelling. 
Arguably all religious people ‘indwell’, to a greater or lesser degree, their respective religious 
narrative. The life references, points of meaning, and various frameworks of understanding which 
inform a religious individual’s existence are more often than not traceable to the paradigms, models, 
values etc that are given within the religious narrative – both the scriptural record as well as 
ancillary histories/stories and so forth – than derived from the intellectual ratiocination of doctrine 
and dogma. Where the narrative base is broad, the religious life that indwells therein likewise 
reflects breadth. But where the base is narrow, the resultant indwelt religious life is correspondingly 
confined. So, I suggest, in the case of fundamentalism a distinguishing factor has to do with the 
narrowness of narrative indwelling that is manifest. It is, indeed, this very narrowness which often 
marks a fundamentalist out from the wider religious tradition and community that might otherwise 
be regarded as conservative, for example.
Set 3 – Contextual Scope: 
(v) Ideological Exclusivism and (vi) Polity Inclusivism
Fundamentalism’s third set includes two factors which, in their apparent paradoxical juxtaposition, 
yield the scope of the context of fundamentalism. The first is ideological exclusivism wherein, 
because there is only one reading, only one interpretation, of the grounding text allowed, the 
ideological view expressed therein, or built thereon, is inevitably an exclusive one. No competing or 
variant ideological view is granted credibility. A fundamentalist perspective will exclude, virtually 
automatically, anything that relative to it appears ‘liberal’, that is, that admits of, for example, any 
limitation, provisionality, otherness, openness or change. Religious fundamentalism excludes 
religious liberalism. Similarly, secular fundamentalism often excludes religion per se on the same 
sorts of grounds. Ideological exclusivism works in multiple directions.
But alongside this exclusivity there may be discerned, somewhat paradoxically, as a sixth factor to 
fundamentalism, a form of inclusion, namely polity inclusion. This refers to the propensity to 
include, in respect to considerations of the policies and praxis of social organisation, all others that 
fall within the fundamentalist’s frame of reference or worldview understanding. This may still 
appear innocuous, especially if the fundamentalists concerned are a minor or marginalised group in 
terms of the wider society in which they exist, or where such an inclusivist stance finds a more 
benign setting within a normative or orthodox religious tradition. Nevertheless, in terms of the 
paradigm analysis I am here pursuing, the fundamentalist for whom polity inclusiveness is a primary 
element is now poised to become activist – to act on this inclusivism in terms of polity, whether 
covertly (as in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints vicariously baptising the dead) or 
overtly (as in the Taliban’s insistence that everyone in Afghanistan live according to their 
application Islam, and variations on this theme found currently in parts of Pakistan and Nigeria).
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So, the apparent paradox of fundamentalism evincing both exclusivism and inclusivism as two of its 
core features is resolved. Excluding all other ideological variants and perspectives necessarily 
implies the wholesale inclusion of a society in terms of the outworking of polity considerations. 
Thus, for example, the fundamentalism of a resurgent Islamist perspective naturally insists not just 
that all Muslims should live according to Islamic Law, but that all members of the society in 
question, irrespective of religion, should likewise submit to this Law Code – understood, of course, 
to transcend human values and codes by virtue of being “God’s law”. The imperative force of this 
element of fundamentalism means that all are expected automatically to submit – or be made so to 
do. We hear of this call being made by activists from time to time in different parts of the Islamic 
world; we may find some variant expressions of it closer to home, if only albeit wistfully, or merely 
in principle, entertained.
Set 4 – Implicit Verification:
(vii) Narrative Correlation and (viii) Rhetorical Corroboration
Principal presuppositions granted, the derivation of authority established, and the contextual scope 
adumbrated, the evolving fundamentalist perspective begins now to move from a variant 
conservative expression of a religious worldview to a more intentional advocacy of religious 
outlook as being, par excellence, the expression of authenticity and truth applicable for all. This 
comes about, initially, with the deepening of the correlation between the religious narrative 
espoused and the reality, or sitz-im-leben, of the religious community concerned. Any 
phenomenology of religion will be able to articulate some such measure of narrative correlation as 
an otherwise quite normal feature of religion as such. That is to say, normatively speaking a religion 
will proffer some degree of correlation between its narrative and the ‘real world’ in which the 
followers of the religion live – otherwise religion would reduce to a simple and obvious fairy-tale 
superimposed upon the ‘real’ world, or set aside from it. However, a distinction can be made 
between the broader traditions of a religion whose narrative correlation will be relatively loose, 
flexible or at least provisional, and the fundamentalist whose degree of correlation will be that much 
greater and intense. Indeed this factor sharpens – and is prefaced by – the elements of absolutism 
and inerrancy as adumbrated above. For a fundamentalist the correlation will be such as to yield an 
unambiguous outcome – America is the Great Satan, ontologically, for example – whereas, for a 
non-fundamentalist critical of the West, America may be deemed or judged satanic in a more 
general way. The difference is one of the supposed degrees of correlation between the religious 
narrative and the external realities of the world in which the fundamentalist lives.
Allied, clearly, to the factor of narrative correlation is that of rhetorical corroboration. Here the 
discourse of fundamentalism can be readily tested. For in the articulation of narrative correlation 
there is likely to found a corresponding intensification of a corroborating rhetoric that situates, 
endorses, and justifies the fundamentalist perspective vis-à-vis the judgements and assessments 
made about the external world in terms of narrative correlation. Rhetoric will be sharp and self-
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affirming; judgements will be clear and reflective of both the correlation factor as well as the 
corroboration factor. Thus the perspective of the fundamentalist derives implicit verification and the 
scene is set for the next step, namely the application of the values espoused from out of the 
fundamentalist’s narrative.
Set 5 – Value Application:
(ix) Otherness Negated and (x) Self-Superiority Asserted
At this stage in the development of a fundamentalist’s outlook the sense of self-affirmation and 
confidence is such that the values of fundamentalism are actively and intentionally applied. And 
these values are primarily two: the negation of otherness or alterity per se, and the corresponding 
assertion of self-superiority over all opponents, real and putative. The negation of otherness is 
perhaps critical at this juncture for the scene set by the third set of factors – contextualising 
exclusivism and inclusivism – now emerge into a devaluing and dismissal of the ‘other’, whether in 
terms of rival community or competing alterities, ideological or otherwise. Indeed, such alterities 
may be – and in fact often are – demonised. The religiously ‘other’ on this view is often cast as 
‘satanic’, or at least seriously and significantly labelled as a hostile opponent, and so hostilely 
regarded.
In the process of negating the other, the self is asserted as inherently superior. My God is greater 
than your god. My Truth reigns over your ignorance. The authenticity of my faith contrasts with the 
feeble delusion you entertain. My laws express the divine reality directly which is infinitely superior 
to the laws which derive merely from human ideas. The salvation offered by my faith is the real 
thing by contrast to the lost way that you proclaim. And so we might go on. However it is expressed 
or referenced, it will be clear enough that the fundamentalist is applying the key value set of 
negativity to ‘otherness’ and a corresponding assertion of self-superiority. The scene is now well set 
for the sixth and final set of factors I have analysed as the components of the paradigm of 
fundamentalism – the rendering of an explicit justification not just for a viewpoint but also for 
actions premised on that viewpoint.
Set 6 – Explicit Justification: 
(xi) Sanctioned Imposition and (xii) Legitimated Extremism
It should be clear that, once the preceding sets of factors are in operation, it is but a short step to the 
final two, which denote the expression of fundamentalism in some form of direct socio-political 
action. For the eleventh factor sees the very imposition of the fundamentalist’s views and polity as, 
in fact, sanctioned by a higher or greater authority – whether that authority is conceived in terms of 
deity or the dynamics of historical necessity, or whatever. This reference transcends the local, 
particular, ordinary taken-for-granted freedoms of everyday life with the requirement to be, live and 
act, in accord with the fundamentalist’s ideological dictates. 
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The sanctioning of the imposition of the fundamentalist’s programme leads naturally to the twelfth 
and final factor of this analysis: extremist action is now legitimated. Once there is in place a sense 
of transcendent sanction for programmatic action, the way to the legitimising of extreme behaviours 
in order to achieve the requisite outcomes, is eased. Japanese kamikaze pilots and Palestinian 
suicide bombers are two examples – now ‘classical’ in terms of recent history – of the outworking 
of the features of fundamentalism that culminate in extreme actions. More complexly, as we have 
recently seen in Afghanistan, not only was it the case that all good Muslims ought to submit 
naturally to the Shari’a, according to the fundamentalist ideals of the Taliban, but indeed all of 
society should be made to submit, like it or not, for impositional submission is an inherent element 
of Islamic extremism. Submission to the dictates of the fundamentalist is at this juncture a matter of 
necessary imposition, as Afghani women found to their cost, for example. And the alternative to 
even an involuntary submission is outright destruction: hence, from the Taliban’s fundamentalist 
perspective, the Buddha ‘idols’ had to be destroyed. How else does the fundamentalist ensure that 
the imposition that has been sanctioned can actually be effected? Sanctioned imposition and 
legitimated extremism are the two sides of the one coin in the currency of terror.
Conclusion
Fundamentalism is not simply a religious or political option in terms of belief perspective. It is a 
package-deal phenomenon marked by a sequence of factors whose cumulative impact can be 
devastating. The Taliban, to return to this example of extreme Islamist fundamentalism, took an 
absolutist, inerrant and exclusivist line with respect to religious identity and behaviour, which was 
extended to include all who were within their purview – namely, the inhabitants of Afghanistan. 
Actions taken to effect their aims were deemed sanctioned by the highest authority – Allah – and 
their extreme measures were in consequence deemed legitimated. Thus no opposition was brooked; 
all had to submit and obey, or face the consequences.
Whether political or religious, of local or global scope, fundamentalism is a phenomenon to be 
seriously reckoned with. Religious fundamentalism, in the form of contemporary Islamism, is the 
seedbed of Islamic extremism and terrorism. To the extent my analysis of the paradigm of religious 
fundamentalism per se is in any way apposite and accurate, and to the extent that empirical evidence 
– for example from speeches, pamphlets etc. – can be adduced, from any given situation, such that 
there is a clear correlation with the above paradigmatic factors, then I suggest that the analysis 
provides a basis, at least, for an empirical measure for the detection, and so  hopefully countering, 
extremist religious fundamentalism – Islamic as well as any other – likely to lead to terrorist 
activity. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly in the long run, such a paradigm analysis may 
assist in the task of tackling the ideology of Islamist extremism head-on. A war on terror is 
inherently unwinable as a military exercise. It requires a change in mindset, in worldview, brought 
about by a shift in religious ideology, if the likelihood of terrorism emerging from within any 
religious community is to be successfully countered. Unmasking the underlying ideological 
framework of an extreme religious fundamentalism is the first step in formulating a countering 
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ideology; developing it is a demanding challenge of interreligious and intercultural dialogical 
engagement.
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